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INDIVIDUAL CONSCIENCE AND THE LAW
Laura S. Underkuffler*
Professor Washington's essay explores two interrelated questions:
first, what conscience is; and second, what its role should be in juris-
prudence or in law.'
Conscience, as it is traditionally understood, has two characteris-
tics. It is claimed to somehow be of God, therefore implicating a
sovereignty above the state. It is also something invoked by the indi-
vidual and, almost more importantly, defined by the individual,
therefore reflecting subjective concepts chosen by the individual
alone.
I think that we would all agree that these characteristics in fact
identify very deep problems that run throughout the intersection of
religion and law. To the extent that conscience is a totally subjective
concept, its collision with civil government is inevitable. If con-
science is of God, and therefore implicates a sovereignty above the
state, and if it is something that is invoked by the individual and
defined by the individual, then this leaves the individual's adherence
to collective norms up to individual choice.2 Moreover, the potential
* Associate Professor, Duke University School of Law.
1. James M. Washington, The Crisis in the Sanctity of Conscience in American Jurisprudence,
42 DEPAUL L. REV. 11 (1992).
2. The United States Supreme Court, in its early cases, defined religion in traditional, theistic
terms. See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting)
(defining religion as "a belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from
any human relation"); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (defining religion as "one's
views of his relations with his Creator"). The Court then moved to a nontheistic definition. See
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) ("Among religions in this country which do not
teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism,
Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism, and others."). At other times, the Court has defined religion
as something that is explicitly left to the declaration of the individual adherent. See United States
v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 76, 86-87 (1944) ("Men may believe what they cannot prove .... Religious
experiences which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that
they may be beyond the ken of mortals does not mean they can be made suspect before the law.").
The problems inherent in combining individually defined religion with First Amendment guar-
antees were recognized by the Court in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Faced with the principle that "'[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of
particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity'of particular litigants' interpretations of
these creeds,' " the Court held that constitutional protection of asserted religious belief must yield.
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scope of this individual choice is unlimited - an example of this
being the claim of Christian fundamentalists that majority-use
school textbooks reflect secular humanism, thereby violating the Es-
tablishment Clause and coercively interfering with the exercise of
those individuals' religious beliefs.3
Professor Washington traces historical responses to this conflict,
which have ranged from a simple assertion of the state's power over
individual conscience4 to the state's efforts to "privatize" conscience
as something which may be a part of private, religious exercise but
which has no role in the public sphere.5 He also discusses what
could be called the evisceration of the concept of individual con-
science through state co-optation. He argues that references to the
sanctity of individual conscience became so commonplace and were
so unexamined that they lost all meaning.'
The problem of reconciling conscience with state authority could
be attacked by challenging the fundamental characteristics of the
concept of individual conscience itself. First, we could attack the
notion that conscience is of God or implicates a sovereignty above
Id. at 887 (quoting Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)). This "must be pre-
ferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges.weigh the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs." Id. Accommodation of reli-
gious belief must be left to the "political process". Id. at 890.
3. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (rejecting
complainant's contention that a prescribed set of reading textbooks in the public schools promoted
evolution, secular humanism, futuristic supernaturalism, and pacifism, in violation of the Free
Exercise Clause), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). See also Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs,
655 F. Supp. 939, 975 (S.D. Ala.) (claiming that "a man-centered belief-system ... [known] by
the appellation 'secular humanism,' [was] promoted in the public schools to the detriment of their
children's first amendment right of free exercise, all in violaiion of the establishment clause"),
rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (1lth Cir. 1987); Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (challenging two exhibitions containing references to evolution at the Smithsonian Museum
of Natural History, on the ground that they supported the religion of secular humanism in viola-
tion of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses).
Claims of similar breadth have also been made in the employment context. In one constellation
of recent cases, religious employees as diverse as "fundamentalist" Christians, Agudath Israel, the
Roman Catholic Church, and the Salvation Army, resisted enforcement of state and municipal
civil rights laws prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of religion, sex, marital
status, or affectional preferences, on the ground that acquiescence would be contrary to the free
exercise of the employer's religious beliefs. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian
Schs., Inc., 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 477 U.S. 619
(1986); In re State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985), dismissed for
lack ofjuris., 478 U.S. 1015 (1986); Under 21, Catholic Home Bureau for Dependant Children v.
City of New York, 482 N.E.2d I (N.Y. 1985).
4. Washington, supra note 1, at 13-14.
5. Id. at 20-21.
6. Id. at 22.
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the state. The threat to the state that individual conscience presents
would be eliminated, under this approach, by its reduction from
something that reflects transcendent reality to a mere statement of
individual consciousness. Conscience would simply be a "byproduct
of intelligence," not something of sacred origin.7 It would simply be
another human characteristic or value, with no particular standing
above other human characteristics or values.8
The second way to approach the problem would be to attack the
notion that conscience is something that is defined by the individual.
Instead, we could substitute some kind of "objective" concept, based
upon principles* or norms that all individuals in the society are as-
sumed to share. Conscience, as "objectively" defined, could then be
used as an operative legal principle to constrain state action. This is
the solution chosen by Professor Washington in his conclusion that
conscience should be redefined as "adherence to the sanctity of the
body."9 Only after such redefinition, he argues, will conscience be
able to play a meaningful role in such areas as the preservation of
religious liberty, the preservation of individual bodily integrity, and
freedom from compulsory military service. 10
From the point of view of the interaction of religion with law,
would anything be lost if we took Professor Washington's approach?
Would there be any loss if we substituted a collectively defined or
collectively determined notion of conscience for one that is individu-
ally defined? There might be potential loss to religion, depending
upon how that is defined, and I think that many of the other speak-
ers have discussed this. The question I would like to ask is this:
Would there be any loss to law? Would there be any loss to the
collective, which is concerned about the development and enforce-
ment of collective judgments?
I would like to suggest that the answer lies in how we see con-
science standing in relationship to law. I think it could be seen in
one of two ways. Conscience could be seen as something interposed
between the individual and, the state - an example of this, of
course, being conscientious objection, one of the foci of Professor
Washington's remarks. Conscience could also be viewed, however,
7. Id. at 29.
8. It could be argued that this is what the Supreme Court has done in leaving accommodation
of religious practice and belief to the "political process," in Employment Division v. Smith. 494
U.S. 872 (1990). See supra note 2 (discussing Smith).




as something to be protected from the state - an example here
being law guaranteeing freedom of religion to protect freedom of
conscience.
When conscience is seen as something interposed between the in-
dividual and the state, the elimination of the notion that conscience
is defined by the individual, and the substitution of some sort of
collective judgment, may not create any particular loss to law or the
process of law. The fact that the collective has, for instance, deter-
mined what recognized "conscientious objection" to collective judg-
ments shall be, may result in the loss in the diversity of individual
beliefs, but will not result in any particular loss to law or to the
process of law. If, however, conscience is seen as something to be
protected from the state, then the result is different. The destruction
of the individually defined conscience, understood this way, may
well result in a loss to law.
How, you might ask, could this be? I think the answer inheres in
the fact that the notion of conscience, in law, involves more than
religious belief, generically stated. In fact, it has several characteris-
tics that are of utmost importance. First, it refers to principles that
transcend politics and collective decisionmaking; it is, as mentioned
above, "of God." To that extent, it is similar to any religious belief;
but this is only the beginning point. Second, it implicates the use of
reason. One cannot have recourse to conscience without some use of
reason. It may be a flawed use in the eyes of others, but there must
be some use nonetheless. Third, as generally understood in this cul-
ture, at least, conscience involves an element of compulsion. A par-
ticular religious practice in a particular religious scheme might be
optional under some circumstances, but the meaning of conscience is
different. Conscience is, in its essence, inalterable and compelling.
And finally, because of its inalterable, compelling nature, I think
that conscience is one of the rare instances in the law where there is
a recognition of individual responsibility. Again, this may be flawed
in the eyes of others - one person's concept of the responsibility
imposed by conscience may be different from another's - but it is
nonetheless a very rare instance in the law where individual respon-
sibility to define principles and to adhere to them is recognized.
What is the benefit to law from all of this? I agree with many of
the articulate spokesmen of the American founding era, whose
works I have been studying in connection with this question, who
believed that the notion of individually defined conscience is one of
[Vol. 42:93
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our few hopes and few protections against the possibility of govern-
mental tyranny. It is important not only for the substantive princi-
ples that it yields, but also for the process that it represents. It is
one of the few indictments against the use of law or the existence of
collective judgments as a justification for the failure to make indi-
vidual moral inquiry. Isaac Backus wrote, "The free exercises of pri-
vate judgment, and the unalienable rights of conscience, are of too
high a rank and dignity to be submitted to the decrees of councils
... ," Thomas Jefferson wrote, "We should . . .moralise for
ourselves, follow the oracle of conscience .. ". . 1 John Adams re-
ferred to the "Liberty of conscience" as "the right of free inquiry
and private judgment.""3 He wrote:
Morals are attributes of spirits only when those spirits are free as well as
intelligent agents, and have consciences or a moral sense, a faculty of dis-
crimination not only between right and wrong, but between good and
evil. . . This freedom of choice and action, united with conscience, neces-
sarily implies a responsibility to a lawgiver and to a law . . ..
Conscience, or "moral respectability," was therefore "necessary to
[the people's] own safety, and to orderly government .... ."1" Only
conscience, rooted in transcendent moral or religious values and im-
posing a sense of responsibility upon freely reasoning persons, pro-
vided the restraint on human conduct necessary for the survival of
government by the people.
There is no doubt that leaving conscience (or the ability to defy
collective norms) to individual determination carries risks. There is
no guarantee, as the Founders recognized, that individuals will not
suffer from imperfections in "moral sense,"16 or, indeed, that all will
agree as to what the relevant transcendent or moral principles
should be. 17 This difficulty, however, inheres as much in moral
11. 1 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 529 (1950) (quoting
Isaac Backus, Plea to the Constitutional Convention of 1787).
12. Letter of Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Aug. 22, 1813), in 2 THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON
LETTERS: THE COMPLETE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND ABIGAIL AND
JOHN ADAMS 367, 368 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959).
13. Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 23, 1825), in 2 THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON
LETTERS, supra note 12, 607, 608.
14. Letter of John Adams to John Taylor (1814), in "IN GOD WE TRUST": THE RELIGIOUS
BELIEFS AND IDEAS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING FATHERS 105, 105 (Norman Cousins ed., 1958).
15. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in 2 THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON
LETTERS, supra note 12, at 387, 390.
16. See, e.g., Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), in "IN GOD WE
TRUST", supra note 14, at 127.
17. See Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Miles King (Sept. 26, 1814), in "IN GOD WE TRUST",
19921
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norms collectively chosen, as in those defined by individuals; the
prevalence with which particular beliefs are held does not indicate
their degree of congruence with abstract moral truth (if, indeed
such exists, and we, as human beings, are able to perceive it). Indi-
vidually defined conscience has, in fact, often provided the only con-
temporary voice against what we now universally agree to have been
atrocities in human history.
Individually defined conscience may lead to claimed individual ac-
tions as above the law, which we as a society do not wish to recog-
nize or which are repugnant to our own individual beliefs. But as
frail and as flawed as it is, individually defined conscience is still a
rare instance in the law where individual responsibility to determine
moral norms is recognized. It is probably unique in that respect. I
therefore believe that as tempting as the clarity of a collective defi-
nition might be, the sacrifice of individually defined conscience, and
the substitution of some collectively or externally determined norm,
would lead to a greater loss to law and to the processes of law.
supra note 14, at 144 (discussing the existence of cross-cultural, transcendent moral norms); Let-
ter of Thomas Jefferson to James Fishback (Sept. 27, 1809), in "IN GOD WE TRUST", supra note
14, at 138 (same); Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Leiper (Jan. 21, 1809), in "IN GOD WE
TRUST", supra note 14, at 138 (same).
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